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Abstract 
EMU countries have engaged in a consolidation of fiscal policies since 2011. This paper 
deals with the public debt and output dynamic consequences of this strategy. To this 
end, we develop a simple macroeconomic model of the Euro area, where fiscal multiplier 
is time-varying. Recent empirical evidence has indeed shown that fiscal multipliers were 
higher in time of crisis. We then analyze the ability of EMU countries to comply with the 
new fiscal rules on public debt. The path of public debt and output gap is simulated 
according to different hypothesis related to fiscal multiplier, monetary policy and 
hysteresis effects. Not all EMU countries would be able to reach a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio 
in 2032. An alternative strategy may be to spread austerity in order to report part of 
consolidation to periods where the fiscal multiplier will be weaker. The gain of spreading 
austerity may yet be partly offset by higher risk premium. There is then a need to find 
institutional arrangements to avoid panics in the sovereign debt markets. Finally, it is 
shown that it would not be very efficient to implement an expansionary fiscal policy in 
Germany in order to balance austerity in the Euro area. Since output gap is nearly closed 
in Germany, the multiplier effect of a positive fiscal stance would be low and spillover 
effects would not be significant. 
Keywords: Fiscal consolidation, Fiscal multiplier, Public debt, Macroeconomic Performance 
JEL Codes: E61, E62, E47 
                                                            
1  Some parts of this paper draw on a larger project, iAGS, and benefited of funding from the Socialists & 
Democrats Parliamentary Group at the European Parliament. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at 
Journées de l’AFSE 2013 in Orléans. We are grateful to the participants for their comments. The usual disclaimer 
applies.  
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Introduction 
 
Public debt has rapidly become a major concern over the last few years. Most 
governments in industrialized had undertaken expansionary fiscal policies in 2009 to 
dampen the macroeconomic consequences of the financial turmoil. But this Keynesian 
revival, which was even supported by the IMF (see Spilimbergo, Symansky, Blanchard 
and Cotarelli, 2008), has been short-lived, especially in EMU. The need to reduce deficit 
in order to comply with the 3% rule for public deficit was indeed enshrined in the 
Stability and Growth Pact. Besides, the outbreak of the Greek crisis had renewed fears 
about a possible sovereign default. Even if the Eurozone crisis cannot boil down to a debt 
crisis (Shambaugh, 2012), it has rapidly been considered that European countries should 
rapidly engage in fiscal consolidation, economic activity was far from its pre-crisis level. 
Governments in the periphery of the Euro area (Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and 
Greece) have been under rising financial market pressures and were urged to restore 
their credibility by implementing frontloaded fiscal consolidation. Besides, fiscal rules 
have been reinforced in the TSCG (Treaty on stability, coordination and governance, 
agreed by 25 out of 27 member states) to converge to a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio, 
achieving 1/20th of the adjustment yearly. As the Treaty was signed in 2012, it gives until 
2032 to achieve the target. 
Thereafter, the on-going episode of fiscal consolidation has undoubtedly been stringent. 
Austerity measures have reached unprecedented levels in Greece. Furthermore, 
consolidation was synchronized among most European countries from 2011 amplifying 
the negative impact on growth (IMF, 2010) and leading the Euro area to a double dip 
recession. Moreover, consolidation was implemented at a moment the output gap had 
not yet been closed. National governments were then facing a dilemma: they sought to 
guarantee long-term sustainability of public debt and wished to avoid stifling the nascent 
recovery. This tradeoff between debt reduction and activity depends critically on the 
value of fiscal multiplier. The former mainstream consensus – before the Great Recession 
– considered that fiscal multipliers were weak and that fiscal policy had very short-lived 
effects2. Recent mainstream literature has emphasized that fiscal multipliers may notably 
be higher in time of crisis3. Then, not only fiscal consolidation would drag down growth 
more severely but it could even be self-defeating (Holland and Portes, 2012). The 
question is then, how large are the costs of consolidation, what will be the debt 
dynamics and is there an alternative strategy to reduce public debt? The aim of the 
paper is precisely to deal with these issues. It considers explicitly that the euro area is 
facing a tradeoff between unemployment and public debt, both of which are interlinked. 
                                                            
2  The SVAR literature that followed the seminal paper by Blanchard and Perotti (2002) started to crack the 
mainstream consensus. In the Post-Keynesian literature, Arestis and Sawyer (2003) revived at the same moment 
the discussion on the usefulness of fiscal policy. 
3  Blot, Cochard, Creel, Ducoudré, Schweisguth and Timbeau (2014a) survey the new literature on fiscal 
multipliers. 
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To judge the interactions between debt and unemployment reduction, we develop a 
simple reduced-form model representing eleven countries of the euro area (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and 
Spain). This model is sufficiently detailed to explicitly link all macro elements of debt 
sustainability and output dynamics. The model also includes one important feature of the 
evidence on fiscal multiplier, its time-varying feature, since it is supposed that the size of 
fiscal multipliers depends on the business cycle. This may be a first attempt to consider a 
time-varying fiscal multiplier in a dynamic macroeconomic model and to consider the full 
consequences of such a feature on the dynamics of public debt and economic activity. 
But, as a strong debate still exists about the value of multipliers and about the evaluation 
of current output gaps, and also because there is of course strong uncertainty about 
future growth or hysteresis effect, we have chosen to parameterize the model in such a 
way that we can conduct a full sensitivity analysis. Finally, the model addresses the quest 
for the optimal fiscal stance, defined as an enhanced fiscal consolidation under some 
strong constraints. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The full model is presented in the first 
section. Macroeconomic dynamics is assessed in the second section according to 
different sets of hypothesis, regarding notably the size of fiscal multipliers, monetary 
policy, initial conditions or hysteresis. The third section seeks alternative strategy to 
reduce public debt or to enhance growth in the euro area. The opportunity to spread 
austerity and to implement a fiscal expansion in Germany is finally discussed. 
 
1. A simple reduced-form model to deal with consolidation, debt 
and growth 
We develop a simple macroeconomic model combining structural and reduced-form 
non-linear equations. Since the aim is to model numerous euro area countries, we use 
simple reduced-form equations to model supply and demand complex mechanisms that 
can be heterogeneous across countries. Hence the model does not derive from optimal 
behaviours: there are indeed multiple competing ways to obtain them though no 
consensus has emerged so far on the best modelling strategies4. Dynamic Standard 
General Equilibrium (DSGE) models rely generally on strong hypotheses concerning the 
behaviour of agents. Households are notably often supposed to be Ricardian, limiting by 
definition the effectiveness of fiscal policy. These models also systematically suppose that 
expectations are rational whereas this hypothesis may be hard to reconcile with reality. 
Besides, DSGE models have performed poorly during the crisis5, underestimating the 
                                                            
4  See for example Wieland et al (2012) for a comparison of fiscal policy effects on output gap for a large set of 
DSGE models. These models make different assumptions on the share of liquidity-constrained households for 
example, a point that is crucial to assess the fiscal multiplier. 
5  See Chatelain and Ralf (2012). 
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deepness of the crisis. Finally, these models do not allow to model nonlinearities such as 
variable fiscal multipliers over the business cycle, since these models are linearized 
around a single point6. We then prefer simplicity in modelling, as it allows us to simply 
calibrate the impact of fiscal policy shocks on output gap and potential GDP.  
Before describing more precisely the equations of the model, some key features of 
our approach are worth mentioning:  
• The model allows for an explicit representation of the main countries of the euro 
area: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. An aggregated euro area is also computed in 
order to deal with global analysis and monetary policy. 
• On the demand side, an open economy aggregate demand function is modelled 
which depends on fiscal and monetary policy, external demand (a channel for 
intra EU interdependencies) as well as exogenous shocks on the output gap. This 
equation also takes into account possible long run effects of macroeconomic 
policies such as long term fiscal policy, threshold effects or hysteresis on 
potential output. The parameterization allows simulating standard hypothesis as 
well as alternatives. Simulations may then help to deal with several scenarios 
regarding for example the effectiveness of monetary policy, the variability of 
fiscal multipliers, the sensitivity of interest rates to public debt…A large set of 
hypotheses may then be covered. In the central scenario, the size of fiscal 
multipliers changes with the state of the business cycle.  
• External demand is represented using a bilateral trade matrix taking into account 
interdependencies between countries.  
• Prices are given by a generalized Phillips curve relating current and expected 
inflation to economic activity, imported inflation and other exogenous shocks. 
Expectations are supposed to be backward-looking. 
• A Taylor rule is used to set the stance of monetary policy.  
• Fiscal balance is the sum of interest payments, cyclically-adjusted balance and 
cyclical components. This simple definition may help to properly assess the fiscal 
stance, i.e. the part of fiscal policy, which is under the direct control (or 
discretion) of current governments. We then compute public debt projections 
for euro area countries. This module will help to assess fiscal sustainability issues, 
as it incorporates issues related to the impact of the market interest rate 
(government-bond yield). 
                                                            
6  A recent exception is the paper by in’t Veld (2013). 
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1.1. Aggregate demand and supply 
Economic activity is described by the gap between the actual level of GDP and a 
baseline trajectory determined by a constant potential growth. However, this baseline is 
distinguished from the potential GDP, which can differ from the baseline due to possible 
hysteresis effects of recession or fiscal policy on potential GDP (see Figure 1 below). As a 
result, we model three gaps: 
• ݕ෤௖  is the gap between the log of real GDP ܻ of country c, and its baseline 
trajectory തܻ which is exogenous. 
• ݕ௖∗ is the gap between log of potential GDP ܻ∗ of country c and the baseline തܻ. 
Dropping country subscripts, the resulting output gap follows: 
(1) ݕ = ݕ෤ − ݕ∗ 
ݕ is driven by aggregate demand in the short run:  
(2) ݕ = ܧܨܫ + ߜ௟. ሺܴ௣௥௜ − തܴ௣௥௜ሻ + ߚ௟. ܽ݀ 
where ܧܨܫ is the cumulated sum of past and current ex ante effective fiscal impulses, 
summing up the fiscal policy effects on aggregate demand. The impact depends on the 
endogenous fiscal multiplier ߤ௧ which is discussed later. ܴ௣௥௜ is the long term real interest 
rate on private bonds and തܴ௣௥௜ is the long run equilibrium value of interest rate. The term 
ߜ௟. ሺܴ௣௥௜ − തܴ௣௥௜ሻ describes the effect of monetary policy on aggregate demand via its 
impact on financial markets and expectations of future inflation. The term ሺ	ߚ௟. ܽ݀ሻ stands 
for the impact of external demand by trade partners. Combining equations (1) and (2) 
gives: 
(3) ݕ෤ = ݕ∗ + ܧܨܫ + ߜ௟. ሺܴ௣௥௜ − തܴ௣௥௜ሻ + ߚ௟. ܽ݀ 
The dynamics of equation (3) is simply represented by the following error correction 
equation7: 
(4) ߂ሺݕ෤௧ሻ = −ߣ. ൣݕ෤௧ିଵ − ൫ݕ௧ିଵ∗ + ܧܨܫ௧ିଵ + ߜ௟. ൫ܴ௧ିଵ௣௥௜ − തܴ௧ିଵ௣௥௜ ൯ + ߚ௟. ܽ݀௧ିଵ൯൧ + 	ߙ. ߂ሺݕ෤௧ିଵሻ +
߂ሺܧܨܫ௧ሻ + ߜ௦. ߂൫ܴ௧௣௥௜ − തܴ௧௣௥௜൯ + ߚ௦. ߂ሺܽ݀௧ሻ + ߝ௧ௗ 
where ߝ௧ௗ is an exogenous shock on aggregate demand. 
Ad-hoc restriction is implemented in the dynamics of equation (4). With a wide open 
output gap, the error correction model would imply growth rates that can be very large 
and unrealistic, whereas growth is certainly bounded during recoveries. The error 
                                                            
7  ݐ stands for time subscript and Δሺݕ෤௧ሻ = ݕ෤௧ − ݕ෤௧ିଵ. 
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correction effect is therefore limited and the final dynamics of the output gap results 
from this bounded effect plus the impact of monetary policy, fiscal policy and external 
trade: 
߂൫ݕ෤௧ന ൯ = ݉ܽݔሾ−ߣ. ሾݕ෤௧ିଵ − ሺݕ௧ିଵ∗ ሻሿ + 	ߙ. ߂ሺݕ෤௧ିଵሻ; 0.025ሿ 
߂ሺݕ෤௧ሻ = ߂൫ݕ෤௧ന ൯ + ߣ. ൣܧܨܫ௧ିଵ + ߜ௟. ൫ܴ௧ିଵ௣௥௜ − തܴ௧ିଵ௣௥௜ ൯ + ߚ௟. ܽ݀௧ିଵ൧ + ߂ሺܧܨܫ௧ሻ
+ ߜ௦. ߂൫ܴ௧௣௥௜ − തܴ௧௣௥௜൯ + ߚ௦. ߂ሺܽ݀௧ሻ + ߝ௧ௗ 
Besides, the gap between potential GDP and the baseline depends on a hysteresis 
effect, a long run impact of fiscal policy and a negative public debt effect: 
(5) ݕ௧∗ = ݕ௧ିଵ∗ + ܪ. ݕ௧ + ߰∝߂ሺߑܨܫ௧ሻ + ߞ. ሺܤ௧ − ܤ∗ሻ + ߝ௧௦ 
ܪ is an hysteresis parameter, ߰∝ assesses the long run impact of fiscal policy on 
potential GDP (we discuss this point in the Fiscal policy section hereafter), ߞ stands for a 
Barro-Laffer effect where debt exceeding a given threshold may have some negative 
impact on growth, ܤ∗ is a public debt target and ߝ௧௦ an exogenous shock on aggregate 
supply. Though their results have been highly debated and questioned, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2010) illustrated empirically this effect and identified the threshold around 90% 
of GDP. Yet, it must be recognized that causality is not clear as low growth may lead to 
higher public debt. A recent paper by Minea and Villieu (2011) provides theoretical 
foundations based on endogenous growth models. 
The Barro-Laffer effect mixes the requirement to increase private savings to match 
lower public savings – the Barro-Ricardo effect – with the requirement to levy higher 
taxes in the future to repay debt and interests. The latter is associated with disincentives 
to produce according to the Laffer effect. Lower private savings and higher disincentives 
to produce would drag potential output8.  
                                                            
8  There may also be some non-linearities as regards the relationship between public debt and real economic 
growth. Some argue (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010, Ceccheti et al., 2011) that above a certain threshold of public 
debt, the latter reduces economic growth, though Panizza and Presbitero (2014) tend to reverse the causality. 
Panizza and Presbitero (2014) also highlight that high debt country may fear a loss of confidence from their 
creditors (the market) and may decide upon a fiscal contraction that drags economic growth, hence a negative 
causality between high debt and economic growth.  
  
7
Figure 1. Example: GDP path and potential GDP path with hysteresis 
 
Source: iAGS model, OFCE. 
Level and Growth rates of GDP 
The growth rate of the baseline for real GDP is set exogenously:  
(6) ߂ തܻ௧ = തܻ௧ − തܻ௧ିଵ 
The growth rate of potential GDP is equal to the baseline if there is no long run 
impact of fiscal policy, no hysteresis and no Barro-Laffer effect: 
(7) ߂ ௧ܻ∗ = ߂ݕ௧∗ + ߂ തܻ௧ + ߝ௧ௌ 
The growth rate of real GDP is given by that of potential GDP and the output gap, 
the growth rate of nominal GDP takes into account the inflation rate, and the level of 
nominal GDP follows: 
(8) ߂ ௧ܻ = ߂ ௧ܻ∗ + ݕ௧ 
(9) ߂ܳ௧ = ߂ ௧ܻ + ߨ௧ 
(10) ܳ௧ = ܳ௧ିଵሺ1 + ߂ܳ௧ሻ 
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1.2. Public finances and fiscal policy 
ܨܵ is the fiscal balance in % of nominal GDP. We decompose it between a structural 
primary balance ܵܲܵ and a cyclical balance ܥܵ, minus government interest payments on 
public debt ܩܫܲ: 
(11) ܨܵ௧ = ܵܲ ௧ܵ + ܥ ௧ܵ − ܩܫ ௧ܲ	
(12) ܵܲ ௧ܵ = ܵܲܵ௧ିଵ − ܨܫ௧ + ߔ. ߂ݕ௧∗	
(13) ܥܵ௧ = ߔ. ݕ௧	
(14) ܩܫ ௧ܲ = ଓ௧஻ഥ . ܤ௧ିଵ ሺ1 + ߂ܳ௧ሻൗ 	
(15) ଓ௧஻ഥ = 1 ܯܣܶ⁄ . ܴ௧௣௨௕ + ሺ1 − 1 ܯܣܶ⁄ ሻ. ଓ௧ିଵ஻തതതതത	
(16) ܤ௧ = ܤ௧ିଵ ሺ1 + ߂ܳ௧ሻ⁄ − ܨܵ௧ + ܵܨܮ௧	
The structural primary balance evolves according to the fiscal impulse and changes in 
taxes due to variations in the gap between potential production and the baseline (eq. 
(12)). This latter point means that a permanent downward shift of potential production 
relative to the baseline would entail a permanent fall in taxes, then a permanent fall in 
the structural primary balance. 
The cyclical balance depends on ߔ , the overall sensitivity of revenues and 
expenditures to the business cycle (eq. (13)). Interest payments on debt (in % of GDP) 
depend on the stock of debt times its average interest rate, and deflated by the nominal 
GDP growth rate (eq. (14)).  
The average interest rate on debt evolves according to the long term nominal 
interest rate on newly issued public bonds. ܯܣܶ stands for the average maturity of public 
debt, and is assumed to be constant. 1 ܯܣܶൗ  then gives the share of debt refinanced 
every year (eq. (15)).  
Public debt (in % of nominal GDP) increases with past debt deflated by the nominal 
growth rate of GDP, fiscal deficits and with an exogenous stock-flow adjustment variable 
(eq. (16)). 
Fiscal policy 
The impact of fiscal policy depends on the state of the economy. This modelling 
strategy has been growing recently in the literature (Parker, 2011), after empirical papers 
show that the fiscal multiplier differs according to the position of the economy in the 
cycle. For example, using regime-switching models, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 
(2010) estimate effects of tax and spending policies that can vary over the business cycle. 
They find large differences in the size of fiscal multipliers in recessions and expansions: 
fiscal policy is considerably more effective in recessions than in expansions. Assuming 
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that the economy can endogenously switch between regimes, they find that historical 
multipliers can vary between 0 and 0.5 during expansions and between 1 and 1.5 during 
recessions9. Here, the fiscal multiplier ߤ௧ is represented as follows: 
If ݕ௧ିଵ < ݕ௠௜௡ then 	ߤ௧ = ߤ௠௔௫  
if ݕ௧ିଵ > ݕ௠௔௫ then ߤ௧ = ߤ௠௜௡ 
if ݕ௜௡௙ ≤ ݕ௧ିଵ ≤ ݕ௦௨௣ then ߤ௧ = ߤ଴ 
if ݕ௠௜௡ ≤ ݕ௧ିଵ ≤ ݕ௜௡௙ then ߤ௧ = ߤ௠௔௫ + ሺߤ଴ − ߤ௠௔௫ሻ ൫ݕ௜௡௙ − ݕ௠௜௡൯⁄ ∗ ሺݕ௧ିଵ − ݕ௠௜௡ሻ 
if ݕ௦௨௣ ≤ ݕ௧ିଵ ≤ ݕ௠௔௫ then ߤ௧ = ߤ଴ + ሺߤ௠௜௡ − ߤ଴ሻ ൫ݕ௠௔௫ − ݕ௦௨௣൯⁄ ∗ ൫ݕ௧ିଵ − ݕ௦௨௣൯ 
The value of the multiplier is maximal in very bad times, whereas it is minimal in very 
good times (see Figure 1).  
Figure 2. Example of the value of the multiplier according to the output gap 
 
Note: ߤ௠௔௫ = 2, ߤ଴ = 0.5, ߤ௠௜௡ = 0, ݕ௠௜௡ = −6%, ݕ௜௡௙ = −1.5%, ݕ௦௨௣ = 1.5%, and ݕ௠௔௫ = 6%. Values are taken 
as illustrative and may vary across countries. 
Source: OFCE. 
Fiscal impulse represents discretionary decisions (in % of GDP) on government 
spending and taxes. It drives the structural primary surplus. We then compute the 
effective fiscal impulse, that is the ex ante cumulative real effect of current and past fiscal 
                                                            
9  See Baum and Koester (2011) for empirical estimates for Germany and Creel et al. (2011) for France; see 
Michaillat (2012) for a theoretical approach. 
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impulses at time t10. Thus, with ߰௞. ߤ௧ି௞. the fiscal multiplier at time t of a fiscal impulse 
that occurred ݇ years ago, one has: 
(17) ߂ܧܨܫ௧ = ߰଴. ߤ௧. ܨܫ௧ + ߰ଵ. ߤ௧ିଵ. ܨܫ௧ିଵ + ߰ଶ. ߤ௧ିଶ. ܨܫ௧ିଶ + ߰ଷ. ߤ௧ିଷ. ܨܫ௧ିଷ +
߰ସ. ߤ௧ିସ. ܨܫ௧ିସ + ߰ହ. ߤ௧ିହ. ܨܫ௧ିହ + ߰଺. ߤ௧ି଺. ܨܫ௧ି଺ + ߰଻. ߤ௧ି଻. ܨܫ௧ି଻ 
(18) ߑܨܫ௧ = ߑܨܫ௧ିଵ + ߤ௧. ܨܫ௧ 
Equation (17) ensures that the impact of a fiscal impulse depends on the fiscal 
multiplier that prevailed at the date the fiscal impulse occurred. We retain seven lags to 
account for the possibility of long lasting effects of fiscal impulses. We might also 
consider the case where fiscal policy has long run effect. This is the case when ߰∝ =
∑ ߰௞଻௞ୀ଴ ≠ 0, ܧܨܫ is then not null in the long run11. The long run impact of a sequence of 
fiscal impulses is then computed using the accumulation of fiscal impulses times the 
multiplier (eq ((18)), and the long run impact on potential GDP is ߤ∝. Σܨܫ௧. 
1.3. Monetary policy, financial markets and prices 
Monetary policy is described through a Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993) where the short 
term interest rate varies according to the gap between euro area inflation ߨ௧ா஺ and the 
ECB target ߨ∗ on the one hand, and with the euro area output gap ݕ௧ா஺ on the other 
hand (eq. (19)). ݎ∗ is the ECB long run target, hence the real equilibrium interest rate. 
We also account for a zero lower bound (0.5 %). The rate set by the ECB is the 
maximum of these two rates (eq. (20)).  
According to the expectations theory, the long term interest rate for German public 
bonds is set equal to the expected sum of future short term interest rates (eq. (21); see 
Shiller, 1979). 
The long term public rate for Germany is considered risk-free, and long term public 
rates of other countries include a risk premium ߝ௧
ூ೛ೠ್ that is set exogenously (eq. (22)). 
We also temporarily set exogenously the long rate for countries that entered the EFSF to 
account for a lower interest rate on debt refinancing. Finally, for each country the long 
term interest rate on private bonds is equal to the public one plus a risk premium that is 
set exogenously (eq. (23)). The long term real interest rate on private bonds is then 
equal to the private nominal long term rate minus long run expected inflation (eq. (24)). 
(19) ݅௧்௔௬௟௢௥ = ݎ∗ + ߨ௧ா஺ + ߖଵ. ሺߨ௧ா஺ − ߨ∗ሻ + ߖଶ. ݕ௧ா஺ 
                                                            
10  It is an ex ante multiplier in the sense that it does not take into account monetary policy effects and feedback 
effects of external trade on GDP following a fiscal impulse. 
11  In that case we introduce a correction term in equation (4) to avoid counting twice the long run impact of 
fiscal policy on ݕ෤௧ via ݕ௧∗ and ܧܨܫ௧. 
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(20) ݅௧ா஼஻ = ݉ܽݔ൫݅௠௜௡; ݅௧்௔௬௟௢௥൯ 
(21) ܫ௧ா஺ = ߬. ܫ௧ାଵா஺ + ሺ1 − ߬ሻ. ݅௧ா஼஻ 
(22) ܫ௧௣௨௕ = ܫ௧ா஺ + ߝ௧
ூ೛ೠ್ 
(23) ܫ௧௣௥௜ = ܫ௧௣௨௕ + ߝ௧
ூ೛ೝ೔ 
(24) ܴ௧௣௥௜ = ܫ௧௣௥௜ − ߨ௧௘,௟௥ 
Prices 
GDP prices are set according to a new Keynesian hybrid Phillips curve approach 
(NKHPC hereafter). Inflation depends on past inflation, expected inflation one period 
ahead, output gap, and the variation of overseas inflation weighted by the share of 
imports coming from country c (eq. (25)).  
Different possible formations of inflation expectations can be introduced. 
Expectations can be rational as in a standard NKHPC equation ሺߨ௧ାଵ௘ = ߨ௧ାଵሻ, or they can 
be adaptive (eq. (26)). In this latter case, we assume that inflation is expected to 
converge to the ECB target at a speed depending on the value of parameter ߢ. 
For financial markets, long run expected inflation is modelled as the discounted sum 
of future inflation rates (eq. (27)), in the same way as nominal long term rates, in order 
to keep expectations consistent on both sides. This assumption could also be relaxed 
insofar as expectations may not be fully rational on financial markets. 
(25) ߨ௧ = ߟଵ. ߨ௧ିଵ + ሺ1 − ߟଵሻ. ߨ௧ାଵ௘ + ߟଶ. ݕ௧ + ߟଷ. ∑ ݓ௠,௝,௖ሺ߂ߨ௧௖ሻ௝ + ߝ௧గ 
(26) ߨ௧ାଵ௘ = ߨ௧ିଵ + ߢ. ሺߨ௧ିଵ − ߨ∗ሻ + ߝ௧గ೐ with 0 ≥ ߢ ≥ −1 
(27) ߨ௧௘,௟௥ = ߬. ߨ௧ାଵ௘,௟௥ + ሺ1 − ߬ሻ. ߨ௧ 
1.4. External trade 
We model external trade using trade matrix between euro area countries. Imports of 
each country grow up relative to the baseline imports when output rises. The strength of 
the increase depends on sensitivity of imports to the output gap (eq. (28)).  
Imports of one country divide into exports of the other countries. Each country faces 
an addressed demand composed of imports of trade partners. The addressed demand to 
country c is the sum of imports of other j countries times the share of imports of country 
j coming from country c (eq. (29)). 
(28) ݉௧ = ߗ. ݕ௧ 
(29) ܽ݀௧ = ∑ ݓ௠,௝,௖݉௧௝  
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Finally, we build euro area aggregates for the main variables of the model. Euro 
area’s GDP is the sum of countries’ nominal GDP (eq. (30)). Country’s weight is then 
derived from equation (30), in order to compute other aggregates such as euro area 
inflation, public debt, fiscal balance, fiscal impulse and output gap (eq. (31)-(33)).  
(30) ܳ௧ா஺ = ∑ ܳ௧௖௖  
(31) ݓ௧,௖ொ = ܳ௧௖ ܳ௧ா஺⁄  
(32) ߨ௧ா஺ = ∑ ݓ௧,௖ொ . ߨ௧௖௖  
(33) ݕ௧ா஺ = ∑ ݓ௧,௖ொ . ݕ௧௖௖  
Calibration of the model is described in the appendix.  
2. Public Debt dynamic under alternative hypotheses 
 
The aim of this part is to provide simulations on the paths of public debt and output 
gap of Euro area member states according to alternative hypotheses on the size of 
multiplier, the effect of monetary policy, hysteresis effects or by taking into account 
possible negative impact of public debt on potential growth. We first describe the central 
scenario where we consider a time-varying fiscal multiplier and hysteresis effects. 
Sensitivity of public debt and output gap is then assessed according to 10 different 
alternative hypotheses. 
2.1. Debt dynamics under the current fiscal adjustment path when fiscal 
multiplier is time varying 
Starting from this simple model, we analyze the dynamics of public debt as well as 
output losses resulting from the given path of fiscal path of consolidation, starting in 
2013. The results of this baseline scenario are illustrated in Table 1 (see box 1 for a 
description of initial conditions and main hypotheses regarding sovereign spreads and 
fiscal impulses). In the baseline scenario, we simulate the path of public debt levels until 
2032, which is the horizon of the 1/20th debt rule incorporated in the revised SGP and in 
the Fiscal Compact. The simulated path of public debt levels depends on the fiscal 
impulses which have been forecast in the euro area from 2013 to 2015. We assume zero 
fiscal impulses beyond 2015. Under the baseline scenario, fiscal multiplier is supposed to 
be time-varying as described in figure 2. Hysteresis effect is also introduced in the model 
so that a negative (respectively positive) demand shock will have negative (respectively 
positive) long-term effect on the GDP level. Growth rates are indeed supposed to 
converge to a fixed and constant value in the long-term. We also suppose that sovereign 
spreads will vanish after 2015. 
  
13
Columns 1-4 report public debt and structural balance respectively in 2020 and 2032 
(20-year horizon). 2020 is the year for which the output gap has returned to zero for 
almost all countries. The cumulated fiscal impulse for 2013-2015, reported in column 5, 
sums up the short term fiscal stance in the euro area. Growth performances (output gap 
and GDP growth rates) are reported in columns 6 to 8. For GDP growth, we reported the 
average growth rate over the austerity period (2013-2015). Beyond 2020, GDP growth is 
equal to the long-term growth rate. 
 
Table 1. Public finance and output performances under the baseline scenario 
 
 Public debt (% of GDP) Structural balance (% 
of GDP) 
Cumulated 
fiscal 
impulse 
Output gap GDP 
growth 
rate (%) 
 2020 2032 2020 2032 2013-2015* Maximum 2013-2020 2013-2015 
Germany 59 26 0.9 1.8 -0.3 -0.7 -0.2 1.5 
France 82 52 -0.5 0.2 -2.9 -6.8 -3.5 1.3 
Italy 91 17 2.9 5.5 -2.1 -6.5 -2.4 1.3 
Spain 97 83 -2.5 -2.2 -4.3 -9.7 -5.2 0.6 
Netherlands 64 49 -1.0 -0.8 -2.9 -2.8 -1.6 1.6 
Belgium 80 37 0.6 1.8 -2.2 -4.3 -2.3 1.9 
Portugal 118 82 -1.1 0.1 -4.7 -10.1 -4.1 0.2 
Ireland 133 105 -3.0 -2.3 -5.7 -10.9 -6.5 -0.3 
Greece 178 93 0.7 3.0 -7.5 -17.1 -11.0 -1.5 
Austria 62 40 -0.2 0.3 -1.9 -0.9 -0.3 1.7 
Finland 36 7 1.1 1.9 -1.3 -1.9 -0.5 2.5 
Euro area 78 43 0.3 1.2 -2.2 -4.8 -2.4 1.0 
* Fiscal impulses are null beyond 2015. 
Source:  iAGS model. 
 
Table 1 reports how tough austerity will be all over the euro area: between 2013 and 
2015, all MS except Germany, Austria and Finland will implement fiscal consolidation 
measures above 2% of GDP. Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece will make the strongest 
efforts. This highly contractionary fiscal stance will make it ever harder to achieve an 
output gap at or above zero in our simulation: all MS will not close the output gap 
before 2019. The aggregate euro area GDP will plummet to a maximum negative output 
gap of almost -5%, with Portugal, Ireland and Greece reaching trough above 10 %. For 
those countries, the cumulated fiscal impulse is strongly negative despite negative output 
gaps. The size of fiscal multipliers should then be high leading to gloomy perspectives for 
the entire euro area. Germany and Austria will be exceptions, since they will face almost 
no further real cost with their forecast fiscal strategy thanks to milder consolidation plans 
and low fiscal multiplier. The average GDP growth rate of the auro area over 2013-2015 
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would reach 1 %, below the average potential growth. Real divergence across euro area 
member states under this scenario would thus widen as Greece would remain in 
recession whereas German GDP would grow at an average rate of 1.5% between 2013 
and 2015. 
In 2020, despite substantial fiscal efforts, Spain, the Netherlands, Portugal and Ireland 
would not be able to bring their cyclically-adjusted deficit under 0.5% of GDP. 
Furthermore, 4 countries – Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland – would not comply with 
the new fiscal rule on public debt as it would still stand above the 60 % threshold despite 
strong efforts to bring back debt to this ratio. In the case of Greece, the threshold would 
not be reached, despite an extraordinary structural surplus of 3% of GDP and an 
outstanding negative fiscal impulse of 7.5% of GDP between 2013 and 2015. Fiscal 
efforts by this country will not be sufficient to achieve the debt target, due to a deflation 
between 2014 and 2018 which increases real interest rates. Due to wide open output 
gap, the cyclical deficit will remain very high. Public debt would then reach a peak in 
2017. It must also be stressed that although the 60 % debt-to-GDP ratio is not reached 
in 2032, public debt would be halved from 2019 to 2032. 
Finally, this baseline scenario questions the issue of public debt sustainability in the 
euro area. Consistently with the new fiscal framework, it seems relevant to fix a 20-year 
horizon for assessing debt sustainability. The simulations are then carried out over this 
horizon. Sustainability refers to the ability of the general government to pay back the 
domestic public debt. This ability depends on the future available scope for spending 
cuts and tax hikes, but also on future economic growth12. 
In our simulations, the public debt sustainability is assessed regarding the ability of 
countries to meet the objective of bringing back the debt ratio to 60 % of GDP by 2032. 
Though some countries in our baseline simulations do not reach this 60% threshold, it is 
noticeable that they achieve substantial reductions in public debt-to-GDP ratios. This 
downward trend in public debt implies enhanced debt sustainability stricto sensu. 
However the social costs as well as the cost in terms of fiscal balance could make this 
adjustment unrealistic (see Buiter and Rahbari, 2014). For Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Belgium, it would indeed require structural primary surpluses close or above 3% of GDP 
for many years. This will obviously question the ability of those countries to maintain 
such a high primary surplus, a situation which has rarely been observed in the history of 
fiscal consolidations. For other countries, debt will fall below 60 %. It is unsurprisingly the 
case for Germany, Netherlands and Finland, but it would also be true for France (52%), 
Italy (17%) or Belgium (37%)…The opportunity to pursue austerity in those countries is 
then raised as existing fiscal rules only state that debt must be below 60 % leaving 
leeway to expand in the near future. We may consider that the baseline scenario goes 
too far: beyond the requirements of fiscal sustainability, beyond the requirements of EU 
fiscal rules and beyond the social resilience of European citizens. For Germany, the 
                                                            
12  The issue of EU debt sustainability and the requirement to limit deficits in this respect are discussed, e.g. by 
Pollin (2011). 
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primary surplus would reach 2.6% by 2032 under the current scenario. As the optimal 
level of public debt is unknown a priori, there is no reason to consider that this situation 
will correspond to the long-term equilibrium. The German government may decide to 
expand fiscal policy in the coming years and our simulation would then show that it 
might not threaten public debt sustainability. 
 
 
Box 1: Main hypotheses for the baseline simulations 
Simulations begin in 2013. To do so, we need to set some starting point values in 
2012 for a set of determinant variables. Output gaps for 2012 come from ECLM-IMK-
OFCE forecasts. Potential growth for the baseline potential GDP is based on OECD 
(2012) projections (see Table 2). Concerning fiscal policy and budget variables, the 
main hypotheses are as follows: 
Table 2. Main hypotheses for 2012 
in % 
 Public debt 
Fiscal 
balance 
Structural 
primary 
balance 
Interest 
expenditures
output gap 
potential 
growth 
Source 
European 
Commission 
ECLM-IMK-
OFCE 
ECLM-IMK-
OFCE 
European 
Commission
ECLM-IMK-
OFCE 
OECD 
Germany 81.7 -0.2 2.7 2.4 -1.0 1.3 
France 90.0 -4.4 1.2 2.6 -6.2 2.0 
Italy 126.5 -2.5 5.8 5.5 -5.5 1.3 
Spain 86.1 -7.4 -0.7 3.0 -8.5 2.0 
Netherlands 68.8 -4.4 -0.9 2.0 -2.8 2.0 
Belgium 99.9 -3.5 2.6 3.5 -4.8 2.0 
Portugal 119.1 -5.5 1.7 4.5 -6.1 1.5 
Ireland 117.6 -8.0 -1.0 4.0 -7.4 2.2 
Greece 176.7 -6.7 4.8 5.4 -14.1 1.9 
Finland 53.1 -0.9 1.3 1.1 -2.1 2.2 
Austria 74.6 -3.0 0.1 2.6 -1.1 1.6 
Sources: European Commission, ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts. 
 
— The public debt in 2012 comes from the European Commission’s autumn 2012 
forecast13; 
— We use the ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts for fiscal balance in 2012;  
— We use the European Commission’s autumn 2012 forecast of interest expenditures 
for 2012; combined with ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts of output gaps in 2012, and 
model estimates of the cyclical part of the fiscal balance, it gives the structural 
primary balance for 2012; 
                                                            
13  At the time simulations programmes were written and run, the final figure for debt was not known. There may 
then be differences with definitive public debt for 2012. Though it changes the starting point, errors are small and 
do not modify the dynamics and the conclusions of the paper. 
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— Fiscal impulses come from ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts for 2013 (see Table 3). For 
2014-2015, we use fiscal impulses implied by the Stability and Growth Pact reported 
in the “Assessment of the 2012 national reform programme and stability 
programme” for each country. 
— Sovereign spreads come from ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts for 2013-2015 (see Table 
4). We made the hypothesis that the ECB program of unlimited debt buying on the 
secondary market (Outright Monetary Transactions) is effective and achieves its goal 
to bring down interest rates for Italy and Spain. Regarding countries relying on the 
ESM for debt financing, we assume that Ireland will get direct access to financial 
markets as of 2014, Portugal as of 2015 and Greece as of 2016. We discuss a 
scenario with higher risk premium hereafter. 
 
 
Table 3. Fiscal impulse 
in % of GDP 
  2013 2014 2015 
Germany 0.0 -0.3 0.0 
France -1.8 -0.6 -0.5 
Italy -2.1 0.0 0.0 
Spain -2.5 -1.2 -0.6 
Netherlands -1.2 -1.2 -0.5 
Belgium -0.8 -0.6 -0.8 
Portugal -2.9 -0.6 -0.2 
Ireland -1.8 -2.1 -1.8 
Greece -3.9 -2.7 -0.9 
Finland -1.3 0.0 0.0 
Austria -0.9 -0.3 -0.6 
Sources: ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts. 
Table 4. Sovereign spreads relative to German interest rate on public debt 
in % 
  2013 2014 2015 
Germany 0.0 0.0 0.0 
France 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Italy 1.3 0.8 0.0 
Spain 1.5 0.8 0.0 
Netherlands 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Belgium 0.5 0.1 0.0 
Portugal 1.4 1.2 1.0 
Ireland 1.4 1.5 0.0 
Greece 1.4 1.2 0.9 
Finland 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Austria 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sources: ECLM-IMK-OFCE forecasts. 
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2.2. Sensitivity of debt and output gap 
The dynamics of public debt and output gap at such a distant maturity critically 
depends on the parameters of the model. However, there are clearly many uncertainties 
on several hypotheses. The impact of fiscal policy notably hinges on the size of multiplier, 
the efficiency of monetary policy, hysteresis effect or the initial conditions regarding 
notably the output gap. The sensitivity of debt dynamics and output gap is analyzed 
according to 10 alternative scenarios: 
Scenario 1: the baseline scenario considers the situation where fiscal variables are 
time-varying and change according to the output gap. In the simulations presented 
above (table 1), the value of the multiplier ranges from 0 to 2. It has a value of 0.5 when 
the output gap is between -1.5% and 1.5%. In the first alternative scenario, we consider 
a fixed value (0.5) of the fiscal multiplier. We then expect the cost of consolidation to be 
weaker for most Euro area countries. Cyclical deficits should then be lower and debt 
would decrease more rapidly. 
Scenario 2: Scenario 2 is equivalent to the 1st scenario but we suppose a higher 
multiplier, equal to the maximum value of fiscal multiplier (2). 
Scenario 3: in the third alternative scenario, we consider a model with no hysteresis 
effect. It means that the decrease in short-run aggregate demand, resulting from 
austerity, does not decrease the level of potential output. In figure 1, it would correspond 
to a case where the red line is not different from the blue line. The output gap would 
then be wider since potential output is higher. GDP growth rate may then be higher 
during the adjustment period. Concerning public debt, two opposite effects may be 
observed. On the one hand, the cyclical component of the deficit would increase. But, 
on the other hand, structural balance would improve more rapidly. Equation (12) shows 
indeed that structural balance deteriorates when potential output is reduced. 
Scenario 4: in scenario 4, we consider higher hysteresis than in the baseline. It would 
then reduce output gap and have theoretically ambiguous effect on public debt. 
Scenario 5: we consider then a situation in which monetary policy is less effective. The 
monetary policy transmission may be impaired by several factors and notably by financial 
crises. In practice, it may result in tighter credit conditions or in higher retail banking or 
long term interest rates. The simple model developed here does not account for such 
transmission channels. We then opted for an ad-hoc and generalized reduction of 
parameters ߜ௟ in equation (4). 
Scenario 6: we change the parameter of the Taylor rule in equation (12) and suppose 
that the ECB focuses only on the output gap with a reaction coefficient equal to 1. On 
could expect a more expansionary monetary policy in the Eurozone than in the baseline 
scenario. But it must be stressed that monetary policy was already constrained by the 
zero lower bound in 2013 and 2014. Yet, with a stronger focus on the output gap, the 
zero lower bound period may last longer and then, it may take more time for ECB rate to 
get back to its long-term value. 
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Scenario 7: scenario 7 is similar to scenario 6 but with the ECB focusing only on the 
inflation target. It would then adopt be a pure inflation targeting strategy. Differences 
may yet be small as inflation, in the baseline, remains below the 2% target until 2021. 
Monetary policy should then be more expansionary than in the baseline, but it may be 
less than in scenario 6. 
Scenario 8: in this scenario, we deal with the adjustment of expected inflation. We 
suppose that expected inflation converges less rapidly to the 2% target. In practice, 
parameter κ in equation (26) is smaller in absolute terms (-0.5 instead of -0.8). It 
would then imply a slowest adjustment of inflation and lower inflation. Monetary 
policy would be then more expansionary but the real interest rate may also be higher 
than in the baseline. 
Scenario 9: we introduce a negative impact of debt on potential output. We consider 
that for public debt above 90% of GDP, potential output is reduced. The effect is 
supposed to be small and the parameter ߞ in equation (5) is calibrated at -0.001. It 
means that for debt-to-GDP ratio at 100%, the percentage reduction in potential 
growth is -0.1. The effect is not permanent and once debt has decreased below 90%, 
the potential growth gets back to the baseline. Given the levels of public debt in the 
baseline, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Ireland, Portugal and Greece would be 
concerned by the negative effect. The stability properties of the model are very 
sensitive to the value of (ߞ). For high value of this parameter and given the level of debt, 
notably in Greece, the model does not always converge to long-term equilibrium. 
Scenario 10: we consider that initial output gaps are lower. There is a huge debate on 
the level of output gap and statistical methods do not allow estimating it precisely. The 
European Commission estimates of the output gap are for example significantly lower 
than in our baseline scenario. This also means that potential output has decreased with 
the financial crisis, a hypothesis that is currently questioned. This assumption is crucial as 
it has consequences on the structural deficit. At given public balance, a lower output gap 
implies that the cyclical deficit is lower and the structural deficit higher. It may have 
strong implications in terms of public dynamics and the needed adjustment to bring 
back public debt below 60% of GDP. 
The results concerning public debt in 2032 for the 10 scenarios are reported in table 
5. It must first be noted that scenarios 1 and 3 display the strongest difference with the 
baseline. The time-varying fiscal multiplier is a very important feature of the dynamics of 
public debt. Considering a low and constant value for the fiscal multiplier would imply a 
significant reduction in public debt in 2032. For the euro area as a whole, public debt 
would reach 25% instead of 43%. It must also be stressed that the gap would already be 
significant in 2020 (see table B.1 in appendix) since public debt would be 10 points 
lower. It is also important to stress that Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece would now 
satisfy the debt criterion, with an output cost significantly lower (table 6). The average 
output gap over 2013-2020 would stand at -2.5% in Spain instead of -5.2. In Ireland and 
Greece, the difference with the baseline in terms of output gap would exceed 4 points. 
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These results may certainly help to explain why national governments and the European 
Commission have supported the frontloaded strategy. They may have considered that 
fiscal multipliers were certainly low. It was thought consequently that austerity measures 
would only have a small negative impact. Empirical evidence and macroeconomic 
performances of European countries should yet have alarmed them that this hypothesis 
would be misleading. Under the alternative assumption of a high and constant fiscal 
multiplier, public debt would not change significantly in countries where the initial 
output gap is strongly negative (France, Italy, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece). But 
when the output gap is smaller, the negative impact of fiscal consolidation is amplified. 
This is the case for the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Finland. For Germany, the 
difference is weak as austerity measures only amount to -0.3% over 2013-2015.  
Table 5. Public debt in 2032 in different scenarios 
 
 DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL IRL PRT GRC AUT FIN EA 
Baseline 26 52 17 83 49 37 105 82 93 40 7 43 
S.1 29 27 1 46 41 22 46 38 -46 43 8 25 
S.2 30 52 19 82 74 48 104 81 93 61 20 47 
S.3 20 19 -12 49 33 15 75 47 126 34 0 22 
S.4 29 70 34 105 56 46 126 102 100 43 12 55 
S.5 29 54 17 81 52 39 101 77 56 43 10 44 
S.6 25 51 15 81 48 36 103 80 91 39 6 41 
S.7 25 51 16 82 48 36 103 81 92 39 7 42 
S.8 24 55 18 89 49 38 118 89 139 38 5 44 
S.9 27 55 23 88 50 40 110 89 97 41 8 46 
S.10 32 59 28 102 51 44 104 74 99 46 15 51 
Source:  iAGS model. 
Hysteresis effects also imply significant differences with the baseline. Public debt is 
indeed lower for all countries in Scenario 3 despite higher negative output gaps (table 6). 
The impact of higher potential output on the structural balance is therefore more 
important. It may not be surprising since the effect of structural balance is long-lasting, 
for a given and constant fiscal impulse, whereas the negative impact of higher cyclical 
deficits resulting from the output gap are only transitory. Table B.2 in the appendix 
shows the average primary structural fiscal balance. For the euro area, it would be 1.2 
point higher if there were no hysteresis effect in the model. In Greece, the structural 
primary surplus would reach 12.1%, 5 points higher than in the baseline. This would 
imply a very fast reduction in public debt as illustrated in table 5 where the Greek public 
debt would become negative14. 
                                                            
14  All simulations are realized considering gross public debt figures. A negative public debt would then 
correspond to a situation where the net debt becomes positive. 
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In scenarios 5 to 7, the differences with the baseline do not appear to be very 
substantial. A more reactive central bank would help to reach a slightly higher output 
gap (see scenario 6 in table 6). Debt in 2032 would also be smaller. But, these 
differences may not be significant. Monetary policy is indeed already expansionary in the 
baseline and constrained by the zero lower bound. It would be needed to take into 
account the possibility of non-conventional measures to amplify the effects of monetary 
policy beyond the standard transmission of monetary policy, notably if purchases of 
sovereign bonds contribute to reducing long-term interest rates. 
In scenario 8, we consider a situation where the adjustment of expected inflation 
takes longer. For most countries, this would not change dramatically the debt dynamics. 
The only changes would be observed in countries threatened by deflation, Ireland and 
Greece notably. For both countries, real interest rates are higher and public debts 
increase relatively to the baseline. Scenario 9, where we take into account a possible 
negative impact of public debt on potential growth has no significant effect on debt 
dynamics. 
Finally, if potential output levels are seriously revised downward as illustrated in 
scenario 10, debt would be higher in 2032: 51% instead of 43% for the euro area. With 
a debt-to-GDP ratio of 59%, France would still comply with the debt objective but the 
objective would be harder to reach for Spain. Considering a weaker output gap would 
indeed imply that structural deficits are higher and in some countries, there may be a 
need to amplify consolidation. 
Table 6. Average output gap (2013-2020) in different scenarios 
 
 DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL IRL PRT GRC AUT FIN EA 
Baseline -0,2 -3,5 -2,4 -5,2 -1,6 -2,3 -6,5 -4,1 -11,0 -0,3 -0,5 -2,4 
S.1 -0,3 -1,7 -1,4 -2,5 -1,0 -1,3 -2,1 -1,4 -3,0 -0,4 -0,5 -1,2 
S.2 -0,5 -3,5 -2,5 -5,2 -3,1 -3,0 -6,5 -4,1 -11,0 -1,7 -1,4 -2,7 
S.3 -0,3 -4,8 -3,2 -9,1 -2,5 -3,7 -11,8 -6,4 -23,0 -0,3 -0,6 -3,7 
S.4 -0,2 -2,6 -1,9 -3,9 -1,1 -1,6 -4,8 -3,1 -7,1 -0,3 -0,4 -1,8 
S.5 -0,4 -3,6 -2,4 -5,1 -1,8 -2,4 -6,3 -3,8 -9,1 -0,5 -0,7 -2,5 
S.6 -0,2 -3,4 -2,3 -5,1 -1,5 -2,2 -6,4 -4,0 -10,9 -0,3 -0,5 -2,3 
S.7 -0,2 -3,4 -2,3 -5,2 -1,6 -2,3 -6,4 -4,0 -11,0 -0,3 -0,5 -2,4 
S.8 -0,2 -3,5 -2,4 -5,4 -1,6 -2,3 -6,7 -4,2 -11,9 -0,2 -0,5 -2,4 
S.9 -0,3 -3,3 -2,2 -5,0 -1,6 -2,1 -6,2 -3,8 -10,4 -0,3 -0,5 -2,3 
S.10 -0,2 -1,8 -1,2 -3,7 -0,7 -1,0 -4,1 -1,7 -7,4 -0,3 -0,3 -1,4 
Source:  iAGS model. 
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2.3. Is it possible to reach 60% for all EMU countries in 2032? 
In the baseline scenario described by table 1, not all countries reach the 60% target 
for debt-to-GDP; they require additional fiscal consolidation to comply with fiscal rules. 
Therefore, we compute simulations that aim at gauging if all countries can attain the 
public debt target in 2032. We calculate a sequence of fiscal impulses over 2015-2032 
that achieve the target, assuming that fiscal impulses for the years 2013 to 2015 are left 
unchanged. For simplicity, we set fiscal impulses at -0.5 for years beyond 2015. Austerity 
is then ended when public debt reaches 60% or is below this threshold. For example, 
public debt stands at 83% of GDP in 2032 in Spain. We consider then an alternative 
scenario where we first add a -0.5 fiscal impulse in 2016 and simulate the debt dynamics. 
If public debt is still above 60% of GDP in 2032, we implement additional negative 
impulse in 2017, etc. We have also emphasized that other countries would reach a debt-
to-GDP ratio below 60% in 2032. But yet, it is not clear whether this level of debt will 
correspond to an economic and social long-term equilibrium. For those countries, 
possibility is left to expand fiscal policy. But, as the equilibrium is unknown a priori, we 
consider that a 60% debt-to-GDP ratio is also the target for 2032. There is no theoretical 
reason behind that choice. It may yet serve as a comparison point for simulating 
alternative scenarios (see next section). Then, we implement +0.5 positive fiscal impulses 
beyond 2015 such as public debt is equal to or below 60%. For instance, if adding 
positive fiscal impulses in Germany from 2016 to 2020 leads to a 64% debt ratio, we 
consider shorter expansionary period (2016-2019 if public debt is then equal to 57%). 
The ability to comply with the debt objective is analyzed in the 2 opposite scenarios: one 
in which fiscal multiplier is time-varying and the other where fiscal multiplier is constant 
and equal to 0.5 (see table 7). 
Reaching a debt-to-GDP ratio equal to 60% would not be feasible in Greece and 
Ireland despite continuous consolidation measures between 2016 and 2032. The 
cumulated fiscal impulses would amount to respectively -14.2% and -16% of GDP. 
Besides, GDP growth rates would be lowered by 1.2% on average between 2013 and 
2020 in Greece, in comparison to the baseline scenario. The 60% target would be 
achieved in Spain and Portugal but under substantially more restrictive fiscal stances. 
Fiscal adjustment under such conditions may appear unrealistic and unreasonable: 
between 2013 and 2017, both countries would experience slower economic growth 
than in the baseline, hence postponing until 2025 (Portugal) and 2027 (Spain) the return 
to a zero output gap. The average growth would respectively be 0.6, 0.4 and 0.5 lower 
than in the baseline, for Spain, Ireland and Portugal. Yet, for the euro area as a whole, 
there would be no difference in terms of growth, as some countries (notably Germany) 
would implement more expansionary fiscal policy. The average growth in France and 
Germany would be 0.2 point higher. 
When the fiscal multiplier is constant and equal to 0.5, all countries succeed in 
reaching the 60% target. It may be noticed that Greek public debt may stand at 22% 
despite fiscal stimulus beyond 2015. In the Greek case, the primary structural balance 
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would indeed improve with potential output. It indicates that in Greece, there has been 
clearly too much austerity. The main problem comes from the output gap and public 
debt would certainly decrease more rapidly once the output gap is closed. For all 
countries, the cumulated need for consolidation would be softened if fiscal multiplier is 
supposed to be constant and low. A great attention should have been paid to the 
estimates of the fiscal multiplier when macroeconomic policy is decided, as was already 
put forward by Creel, Heyer and Plane (2011). Yet, Blanchard and Leigh (2013) warned 
that previous forecast models of the IMF had probably underestimated the multiplier 
effect. Taking these early signals into account, should have led the European Commission 
and European national governments to mitigate austerity in the euro area. 
 
Table 7. Is it possible to get to 60% in 2032? 
 
 When fiscal multiplier is time-varying When fiscal multiplier is low and constant 
 Public debt 
in 2032 
Average GDP 
growth 
(2013-2020)* 
Cumulated 
fiscal impulse 
Public debt 
in 2032 
Average GDP 
growth 
(2013-2020)* 
Cumulated 
fiscal impulse 
Germany 58 0,2 2,2 58 0,1 1,7 
France 60 0,2 -1,9 59 0,4 -0,4 
Italy 58 0,2 1,9 57 0,3 3,4 
Spain 55 -0,6 -9,3 56 0,4 -3,8 
Netherlands 55 0,0 -2,4 57 0,1 -1,9 
Belgium 55 0,1 -0,7 56 0,3 0,3 
Greece 85 -1,2 -14,2 22 1,1 1,0 
Portugal 57 -0,5 -7,7 56 0,4 -2,7 
Ireland 71 -0,4 -16,0 56 1,0 -5,2 
Austria 55 0,0 -0,9 60 0,0 -0,9 
Finland 58 0,1 3,2 61 0,1 3,2 
Euro area 58 0,0 -1,2 57 0,3 0,3 
*: in difference with central scenario summarized in table 1. 
Source:  iAGS model 
3. Alternatives to austerity 
 
In this section, we first address the issue of the opportunity to spread austerity to take 
advantage of the time-varying multiplier15. Then, we also consider a scenario where a 
more expansionary fiscal policy is implemented in Germany. It has indeed been claimed 
that countries where public debt sustainability is not threatened should expand their 
                                                            
15  This scenario is also detailed and presented in Blot, Cochard, Creel, Ducoudré, Schweisguth and Timbeau 
(2014b). Yet, we present here additional simulations where we account for the possibility that sovereign spreads 
may increase, due to credibility effects, when fiscal adjustment is softened. 
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fiscal policy in order to balance the negative effect of austerity in countries where there is 
an urgent need to reduce public debt. Interdependencies among EMU members would 
then boost external demand in crisis countries (Spain, Ireland…) and mitigate the effect 
of austerity. 
3.1. The case for spreading austerity 
The scope of alternative scenarios is inevitably infinite and any scenario reducing the 
strength of fiscal consolidation would improve growth but it may also undermine the 
sustainability of public debt. The identification of an alternative strategy is then 
fundamentally based on a trade-off between growth and debt. The stronger the 
consolidation, the costlier it is in terms of output losses and the more debt is reduced 
unless the size of the fiscal multiplier exceeds 2. Conversely, a more cautious path of 
consolidation may delay the reduction of debt but it would improve growth. Taking into 
account the objective of the TSCG, we maintain the objective for public debt at 60% of 
GDP in 2032. Yet, we consider the possibility of spreading austerity over time from 2013. 
Current fiscal impulses are then replaced by maximum negative fiscal impulses of -0.5% 
of GDP. Fiscal impulse may also be positive when past consolidation would have led 
public debt below 60% of GDP. This is notably the case for Germany and Italy. We first 
run these simulations with constant sovereign debt spreads. Yet, fiscal consolidation has 
also been urged because governments had lost credibility. Sovereign spreads started to 
increase in 2008 and were then pushed up by the outbreak of the Greek crisis (Arghyrou 
and Tsoukals, 2011). In those circumstances, one should also take into account the fact 
that spreading austerity may reduce credibility of government, if doubts are raised by 
financial markets about the commitment to postpone part of the consolidation in the 
future. Hence, we introduce a risk premium in the long-term public interest rate equation 
(22) as long as public debt exceeds 60% of GDP. The risk premium is calibrated such 
that for a public debt equal to 100% of GDP, sovereign yields are increased by 1 point. It 
must be noted that the risk premium effect is calibrated for all countries and not only 
crises countries such as Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland or Greece. But as German public 
debt is lower than public debt in those countries, it will imply higher interest rates for 
crises countries than for Germany, increasing the spreads. It must be stressed that this 
effect will not hold as long as countries are in the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), 
which is supposed to be the case until 2015 for Greece, 2014 for Portugal and 2013 for 
Ireland. 
The results for these two scenarios are reported in table 8. Average GDP growth over 
2013-2020, cumulated fiscal impulse and long-term interest rate for the period 2013-
2020 are computed in comparisons with the same variables in the scenario where 
austerity is not spread and where the objective is to bring back public debt to the 60% 
debt-to-GDP ratio by 2032. It must first be stressed that even without the risk premium 
effect, interest rate are higher in the scenario where austerity is spread. This may result 
from improved output gap. Monetary policy is then less expansionary. Actually, ECB is 
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not constrained by the zero lower bound from 2013 to 2015. The short term interest 
rate would increase from 0.8% in 2012 to 2.5% in 2016. Otherwise, average growth 
would on average increase by 0.1. But, from 2013 to 2017, the GDP growth rate for the 
euro area as a whole would be 0.6 point higher. During this period, there would be less 
austerity than in the baseline. The most favorable effect would be observed in Spain, 
Portugal, Greece and Ireland. The main reason is that when consolidation is spread, it 
implies that less consolidation is implemented when the fiscal multiplier is high. The 
corollary is that a larger share of the consolidation is implemented after the output gap 
has recovered. The negative impact on growth is then reduced. There is less 
consolidation when it hurts the most and more when it hurts the least. The most striking 
difference is identified for Greece where the average growth between 2013 and 2017 is 
3.6 points higher than if the current expected consolidation path is implemented. 
Besides, this strategy would enable Greece to reduce debt in 2032 more significantly 
even though the cumulated fiscal stance would be increased by 12.5 points of GDP. For 
the euro area as whole, fiscal policy would be less restrictive or more expansionary by 0.4 
point of GDP than in the scenario where austerity is not spread. The situation of France 
would be close to the euro area average. Fiscal policy would also be significantly less 
restrictive in Spain, Portugal and Ireland. On the contrary, it would be more restrictive in 
Germany and Finland. 
 
Table 8. The advantage of spreading austerity* 
 
 When fiscal multiplier is time-varying When sovereign spreads increase with debt 
 Average GDP 
growth 
(2013-2020) 
Cumulated 
fiscal impulse 
Long-term 
interest rate 
(2013-2020) 
Average GDP 
growth 
(2013-2020) 
Cumulated 
fiscal impulse 
Long-term 
interest rate 
(2013-2020) 
Germany -0,1 -0,7 0,3 -0,2 -1,2 0,3 
France 0,0 0,4 0,3 -0,2 -1,1 0,5 
Italy 0,1 0,1 0,3 -0,1 -1,9 0,7 
Spain 0,6 2,3 0,3 0,4 -0,7 0,6 
Netherlands 0,0 0,4 0,3 0,0 -0,6 0,3 
Belgium 0,1 0,7 0,3 -0,1 -0,8 0,5 
Greece 1,9 12,5 0,1 1,6 8,5 0,7 
Portugal 0,6 3,7 0,1 0,4 -0,8 0,6 
Ireland 1,1 4,2 0,2 0,9 4,2 0,8 
Austria 0,0 -0,1 0,3 -0,1 -0,6 0,3 
Finland 0,0 -1,7 0,3 0,0 -1,2 -0,4 
Euro area 0,1 0,4 0,3 0,0 -1,0 0,5 
*: in difference with central scenario summarized in table 7. 
Source:  iAGS model 
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With higher risk premium, results are partly modified. The average fiscal impulse 
would be more restrictive for the euro area as a whole. It is the case for all countries but 
Greece and Ireland. Despite, higher interest rates, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece 
would still benefit from a scenario where austerity is spread. But, for the euro area as 
whole, growth performance between 2013 and 2020 would not be improved. This result 
may partly explain why European countries have chosen to engage in frontloaded 
consolidation despite the output costs. It has often been claimed that there was no 
alternative to austerity since spreading or postponing the needed fiscal effort would have 
triggered new speculative attacks and higher interest rates. In our scenario, the spread 
with the German interest rate would increase by 0.5 point in Ireland, 0.4 point for Italy 
and Greece, 0.3 point for Spain and Portugal. It may yet be argued that risk premium are 
non linear and partly driven by contagion and self-fulling prophecies (de Grauwe and Yi, 
2013). It should be reminded that spreads were still rising in 2011 and 2012 for Italy and 
Spain despite several fiscal adjustment plans. Even if it is impossible to assess what would 
have been the development of spreads if countries had considered an alternative fiscal 
strategy, it remains that consolidation has not been a sufficient condition to ensure 
credibility. Institutions may also matter and spreads have actually receded after countries 
adopted the TSCG and mainly after Mario Drahi, President of the ECB, has pledged to do 
“whatever it takes” to protect the euro area from a collapse. Credible announcements of 
a central banker to intervene in the sovereign debt market may be more efficient than 
those made by government to cut back public deficit. 
3.2. The case for a German expansion 
Finally, we simulate the impact of a German expansion. It has indeed been often 
claimed that austerity in crises countries should be balanced by more expansionary fiscal 
policy in the Northern countries and notably in Germany where the government has 
more fiscal leeway. To this end, we consider an alternative scenario where fiscal impulse 
is increased by 1 point of GDP, compared to the current expected fiscal impulse, from 
2013 to 2015. Fiscal policy stance is unchanged in all other Euro area members. This 
expansionary fiscal policy is reversed from 2017 to 2019, with a reduction of the fiscal 
impulse by 1 point. There is then no change in the cumulated German fiscal impulse. 
The aim here is twofold: first, assessing the spillover effects from core to periphery 
countries (here, we take the case of Spain). Second, this scenario is compared to a similar 
one where an equivalent fiscal stimulus is implemented in the periphery, namely Spain 
here. Thus, the question is raised about where it would be more efficient to “spend” a 
given amount of money (equivalent to 1 point of German GDP, which corresponds to a 
2.6 point of Spanish GDP). 
Results of table 9 unambiguously show that a German fiscal expansion would mainly 
stimulate German growth. The spillover effects for Spain would be negligible. Growth 
would be automatically increased in the euro area due to the large weight of Germany in 
total GDP. Weak spillover effects result from the low value of fiscal multiplier in Germany. 
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As the output gap is nearly closed in Germany, fiscal multiplier is roughly equal to 0.5. 
Domestic demand is boosted but less so than with a higher fiscal multiplier (close to or 
above unity). The spillover effects resulting from an increased external demand in Spain 
are then weak and may even be partly offset by the increase in the interest rate. German 
expansion would mechanically increase euro area growth and may lead the ECB to 
tighten monetary policy according to the Taylor rule. 
Conversely, the same amount of money spent in Spain would boost Spanish growth 
directly and with a higher multiplier effect since the output gap is more deteriorated 
than in Germany. The global impact for growth in the euro area is also amplified: +0.7 
point in 2014 against 0.2 if expansion is implemented in Germany. When the size of the 
fiscal multiplier is linked to the business cycle, money should be spent where it is mostly 
needed, that is in the periphery rather than in core of the Euro area. What is needed is 
thus a change in the geographical composition of the fiscal adjustment within the euro 
area. There are only small advantages with letting countries with higher fiscal leeway to 
adjust more slowly. On the contrary, it would be efficient to soften consolidation when 
countries are already concerned with mass unemployment and banking troubles. The 
issue of credible arrangements to ease consolidation in the periphery needs to be raised 
again. 
Table 9. German or Spanish fiscal expansion?* 
 
 German fiscal impulse Spanish fiscal impulse 
 German GDP growth 
Spanish GDP 
growth 
Euro area 
GDP growth 
German GDP 
growth 
Spanish GDP 
growth 
Euro area 
GDP growth 
2013 0,5 0,0 0,2 0,0 4,9 0,5 
2014 0,6 0,0 0,2 0,0 5,8 0,7 
2015 0,5 0,0 0,2 0,0 2,8 0,4 
2016 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,7 -0,1 
2017 -0,6 0,0 -0,2 0,0 -2,6 -0,3 
2018 -0,8 0,0 -0,2 0,0 -3,0 -0,3 
2019 -0,7 0,0 -0,2 0,0 -2,9 -0,3 
*: in difference with scenario described in table 7 
Source:  iAGS model. 
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Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have presented a simplified macroeconomic model representing 11 
EMU countries. The aim was to analyse public debt and output dynamics regarding fiscal 
rules and notably the 60% target for public debt. To this end, we develop a very 
tractable model able to integrate features emphasized by recent empirical literature on 
the fiscal multiplier. Besides, the model is supposed to be tractable to account for other 
several theoretical backgrounds. Based on this model, we present several simulations to 
assess the impact of the expected fiscal stance. We show that current fiscal adjustment is 
unambiguously costly confirming what has been observed in the euro area in 2011 and 
2012. Yet, the costs of consolidation and the public debt dynamics critically hinge on the 
size of fiscal multipliers. Economic policy decisions made by national governments or 
recommendations formulated by the European Commission should be based on reliable 
estimates of the fiscal multiplier. We also show that it would have been better to spread 
consolidation. Output costs would have been lessened without challenging the ability to 
achieve the 60% debt-to-GDP ratio. Such a scenario may have given rise to doubts on 
the credibility of a partly postponed fiscal adjustment. Though increasing risk premia 
would have reduced the gain resulting from a spreading strategy, we consider that 
frontloaded fiscal consolidation was not the appropriate answer to enhance credibility. 
Active monetary policy and increased fiscal and political integration, permitting a 
substantial change in the geographical composition of the fiscal adjustment within the 
euro area, would be a better solution to avoid panic-driven austerity and its consecutive 
increase in interest rates. 
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APPENDIX 
Calibration 
A. Aggregate demand and supply 
We calibrate equation (4) by distinguishing short run and long run effects of 
monetary policy and external trade on GDP. Long run effect of long term yields is higher 
than the short run one, to take into account delays in monetary policy effects on output.  
We set ߚ௟ equal to the share of exports in country’s GDP, and ߚ௦ equal to half ߚ௟. 
 
Table A1. Calibration of monetary policy and external demand  
effects on output 
 ࢾ࢙ ࢾ࢒ ࢼ࢙ ࢼ࢒ 
Austria -0.20 -0.50 0.29 0.58 
Belgium -0.20 -0.40 0.40 0.81 
Finland -0.20 -0.45 0.23 0.46 
France -0.20 -0.50 0.13 0.27 
Germany -0.30 -0.50 0.25 0.50 
Greece -0.40 -0.80 0.13 0.25 
Ireland -0.30 -0.70 0.50 1.00 
Italy -0.40 -0.75 0.14 0.28 
Netherlands -0.20 -0.45 0.40 0.79 
Portugal -0.40 -0.80 0.17 0.34 
Spain -0.30 -0.70 0.15 0.30 
Source: iAGS Model, OFCE. 
The critical point in calibrating equation (4) is to set the speed of convergence of 
output to its long run equilibrium. This speed depends on values of ߣ and ߙ, that are the 
same across countries. We fix ߙ to 0.1 and ߣ to -0.3.These values ensure that the speed 
of convergence of output to its long run value is comparable in normal times to that of 
standard DSGE models. With these values, the output gap is closed about 5 years after a 
shock. 
Concerning equation (5), long run effects on potential GDP can come from 
hysteresis effects, a Barro-Laffer effect of debt on potential GDP and a long run effect of 
fiscal policy. 
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Table A2. Calibration of hysteresis,  
Barro-Laffer and long run effect of fiscal policy 
Hysteresis Barro-Laffer Barro-Laffer 
ࡴ ࣀ ࣆ∝ 
0.15 0 0 
Source: iAGS Model, OFCE. 
 
Barro-Laffer and fiscal policy effects on potential GDP are set to 0 for standard 
simulations. The impact of non-zero values will be discussed in future work. We calibrate 
the hysteresis effect to 0.15 in order to obtain qualitatively similar impacts of transitory 
and permanent fiscal impulses on potential growth, as those obtained with QUEST III 
(see Figure A.1). 
We used the Macroeconomic Model Database to perform deterministic simulations 
of the QUEST III model. For the simulation, fiscal policy rules are disconnected and 
shocks are done on the share of government consumption to GDP ratio. 
Figure A.1. Calibration of hysteresis effects of fiscal policy on potential GDP  
In % 
 
Notes: Results are in difference from baseline. 
Sources: Macroeconomic Model Database - Wieland et al. (2012), iAGS Model, OFCE. 
Public finances 
The most important parameter to set for public finances is ߔ, the overall sensitivity of 
revenues and expenditures to the business cycle. To do so we use the European 
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Commission estimates. To compute the average interest rate on public debt, we 
compute an average maturity of public debts using national sources on public debt 
maturity structures in 2011. 
Table A.3. Calibration of public finances parameters 
 ࢶ ࡹ࡭ࢀ 
Austria 0,47 8,1 
Belgium 0,54 6,8 
Finland 0,50 5,0 
France 0,49 6,9 
Germany 0,51 6,1 
Greece 0,43 11,3 
Ireland 0,40 6,9 
Italy 0,50 6,6 
Netherlands 0,55 7,0 
Portugal 0,45 6,1 
Spain 0,43 6,8 
Sources: European Commission (2005), OFCE. 
Fiscal policy 
Calibration of fiscal policy parameters determines the duration impact of fiscal policy 
on GDP. We calibrate the effective fiscal impulse to return to 0 in seven years in normal 
times, i.e. when the output gap is close to 0 (see Figure A.2). Indeed the effective fiscal 
impulse also depends on the value of the ex ante instantaneous fiscal multiplier ߤ௧, which 
can vary over time according to the output gap. More precisely, we define normal times 
as economic states in which output gap is greater than -1.5% and lesser than 1.5%. In 
that case, we fix the ex ante instantaneous fiscal multiplier to 0.5 for big countries 
(Germany, France, Italy and Spain), and to 0.3 for other countries, accounting for the 
fact that fiscal multipliers are generally smaller for small countries (see the recent 
estimates by Ilzetsky et al., 2011). When output gap is over 1.5%, the ex ante 
instantaneous fiscal multiplier linearly decreases to 0, until output gap reaches 6%. 
In bad times, the ex ante instantaneous fiscal multiplier increases as output gap 
deteriorates. We set its maximum value to 2 when output gap reaches -6%. 
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Figure A.2. Effective fiscal impulse in normal times with ࣆ࢚ = ૙. ૞ following  
a positive fiscal impulse (1% of GDP) 
 
Source: OFCE. 
External trade 
We set the sensitivity of imports to output gap equal to the share of imports in 
country’s GDP. The matrix of trade exchanges between countries comes from the 
Chelem Database for year 2003. 
Table A.4. Calibration of the sensitivity of imports  
to output gap 
 ࢹ 
Austria 0.5 
Belgium 0.8 
Finland 0.4 
France 0.3 
Germany 0.4 
Greece 0.3 
Ireland 0.8 
Italy 0.3 
Netherlands 0.7 
Portugal 0.4 
Spain 0.3 
Source:  OECD Economic outlook 91. 
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Monetary policy and financial markets 
We choose standard values for the Taylor rule. The short term interest rate is bound 
at 0.05% to account for the zero lower bound on monetary policy. We fix ߬ = 0.82, a 
value compatible with a long run nominal interest rate of 4% (see Shiller, 1979, or Fuhrer 
and Moore, 1995). 
Table A.5. Calibration of monetary policy parameters 
ࢸ૚ ࢸ૛ ࣊∗ ࢏࢓࢏࢔ 
0.5 0.5 2% 0.05% 
Source:  iAGS Model, OFCE. 
Prices 
Values for ߟଵ and ߟଶ are standard in empirical literature on New Keynesian Hybrid 
Phillips curve estimates (Rudd and Whelan, 2006; Paloviita, 2008).  
Table A.6. Calibration of Phillips curve and expected inflation parameters 
ࣁ૚ ࣁ૛ ࣁ૜ ࣄ 
0.5 0.1 0.1 -0.8 
Source:  iAGS Model, OFCE. 
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B. Additional tables 
 
Table B.1. Public debt in 2020 in different scenarios 
 
 DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL IRL PRT GRC AUT FIN EA 
Baseline 59 82 91 97 64 80 133 118 178 62 36 78 
S.1 61 67 81 75 59 71 93 91 85 64 37 68 
S.2 60 82 92 97 78 86 133 118 178 74 43 81 
S.3 56 73 81 95 60 76 139 111 237 59 33 74 
S.4 60 87 96 103 65 82 138 124 169 63 38 82 
S.5 60 83 91 96 65 81 130 115 153 63 37 79 
S.6 58 81 89 96 63 79 131 117 177 61 35 77 
S.7 58 81 90 96 63 79 132 117 177 61 36 78 
S.8 58 85 92 102 64 81 143 125 212 61 35 80 
S.9 59 83 92 98 64 80 133 119 176 62 36 79 
S.10 61 81 92 103 62 79 127 108 171 64 39 80 
Source:  iAGS model. 
Table B.2. Average primary structural balance 
 
 DEU FRA ITA ESP NLD BEL IRL PRT GRC AUT FIN EA 
Baseline 2,9 2,3 6,5 1,0 1,0 3,4 1,7 3,4 7,1 1,8 2,3 3,0 
S.1 2,8 3,2 7,0 2,3 1,3 3,9 3,5 4,7 10,6 1,7 2,3 3,6 
S.2 2,7 2,3 6,4 1,1 0,2 3,0 1,7 3,4 7,1 1,1 1,9 2,9 
S.3 3,0 4,1 7,8 3,4 1,9 4,7 4,4 5,4 12,1 1,9 2,6 4,2 
S.4 2,8 1,3 5,7 -0,2 0,6 2,8 0,5 2,4 5,6 1,7 2,1 2,4 
S.5 2,8 2,2 6,5 1,1 0,9 3,3 1,8 3,6 8,0 1,7 2,2 3,0 
S.6 2,9 2,3 6,5 1,1 1,0 3,4 1,8 3,5 7,1 1,8 2,3 3,1 
S.7 2,9 2,3 6,5 1,1 1,0 3,4 1,8 3,4 7,1 1,8 2,3 3,1 
S.8 2,9 2,3 6,5 1,0 1,0 3,4 1,6 3,4 6,7 1,8 2,3 3,0 
S.9 2,8 2,1 6,2 0,8 1,0 3,2 1,4 3,0 6,7 1,8 2,3 2,9 
S.10 2,6 1,6 5,8 -0,1 0,8 2,8 1,3 3,2 5,7 1,6 1,9 2,5 
Source:  iAGS model. 
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